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

MEETING THE THREAT OF COMMUNISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

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INTRODUCTION

The scope of this paper is a discussion regarding the influence of communism in Latin America. It includes an analysis of that influence in a specific area, the Brazilian Northeast.

The purpose of the discussion is to determine the adequacy and feasibility of the processes in use to meet the Communist threat.

The understanding of the actual conditions of Latin America, both economic and social, was considered to be indispensable for the purposes of the discussion. Since the countries south of Rio Grande have been living for many years in an apparent passivity, the analysis of the causes that produced a dramatic change from that condition to the present revolutionary atmosphere was considered to be necessary.

The presence of communism in Latin America has to be historically examined in order to deteet its pattern of actions, its successes, and failures. Although the subversion methods have had an extraordinary evolution since the Second World War, tbat examination will provide an outline of the responses from the Latin Americans to the influence of communism.

Latin America has been living in quiet isolationism. The evolutionary process of the political system in the nations south of Rio Grande is not

quite understood by the most advanced nations since it does not conform with the predicted standards. We intend to study that system in order to provide an adequate answer to the question, How dependable are the governments in Latin America for the confrontation with communism?

The information derived from the discussion will permit a more clear understanding of how much we may depend upon the actual structure of Latin America and how adequate and feasible are the instruments planned to check the Communist threat to the hemisphere.

I — THE ARENA

The Understanding of the Problem. During the last decades many books, essays, and studies have been published dealing with Latin America. Backwardness, underdevelopment, illiteracy, subversion, foreign aid, and the Communist threat are the main subjects dealt with in such literature. There is a feeling of urgency in the approaches to the analysis of Latin America's problems, and although those problems are basically interrelated, it seems to us that there is a lack of balanced discussion on the subject.

The cold war environment introduced, in some instances, an accentuated distortion in the analysis of how much the Communist threat in itself is the main danger, or whether the economic and social conditions prevailing in Latin America would provide an ideal environment for the Communist credo to flourish at a more accentuated speed than it would be possible by the action of local Communist Parties under the direction of Moscow and Peking.

In other words, insufficient attention has been given to determine in which direction one would find a higher flux: if inwards, due to the permanent ideas of the universal communism trying to conquer more areas; or outwards, from the masses in Latin America trying to experiment with other doctrines or with another form of environment that could change their social and economic situation.

The sense of urgency in the attempts to find a solution or solutions for the problem is, however, a valid one. There are more than 200 million people occupying the 8 million square miles south of Rio Grande. This represents 8 percent of the world's population on 19 percent of the world's inhabited lands. Forty years from now nearly 600 million people will live there. Also, Latin Americans are restive and striving for solutions that would change their actual environment.

Dr. Milton Eisenhower, writing on Latin America, states that:

> There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that revolution is inevitable in Latin America. The people are angry. They are shackled to the past with bonds of ignorance, injustice and poverty. And they no longer accept as universal or inevitable the oppressive prevailing order which has filled their lives with toil, want and pain. . . . And so they are filled with a fury and a determination to change the future.[1]

The combination of the demographic problems, the upsurge of the new aspirations, and the growing political consciousness of the masses presents a considerable challenge. Economic development and social reforms, at a rate and to an extent that may satisfy the needs implicit in such challenge, have been considered as an adequate solution.

The penalties for failure will include, inevitably, a progressive political instability, the frustration of the aspirations of large sections of the population, and the lack of a firm foundation from

which dynamic and progressive democratic societies may evolve.[2]

The understanding of Latin America's problems, however, in the search for adequate solutions, must include the knowledge of the economic, political, and social forces which are provoking the profound changes in attitudes towards so many of the traditional rules that had been prevailing for many years. And that understanding, to be consistent, must have as a background, "the learning of the economic, political and social forces which formed the sphere of application and conditioned the effectiveness of the rules which at times were reasonably effective." [3]

Likewise, it is necessary to consider that although we are dealing with the area as a whole, such procedure in many cases may be inadequate.

The social organization of Latin America is largely complex and diverse, varying from country to country and from region to region within a single country. Generalizations about Latin American society, therefore, tend to be both artificial and superficial. However, due to historical, geographical, and environmental trends, it is apparent that there is a sufficient cultural common background to distinguish Latin America as a unity from other areas and to support a few carefully formulated generalizations.[4]

The Background. Looking into history we may recognize that the political independence period, early in the 19th century, did not contribute to change the overall position of the Latin American states in relation to the international arena. An explanation for such behavior can be found in the fact that, in the period under consideration, the difficulty of communications made physical distance from the main threats of international conflict still a major factor in the degree of participation in world affairs.

The causes for the political independence of the Latin American countries may be related not only to the example set by the United States in 1776, but also to the weakness of Spain and Portugal, incapable at that time of preventing the former colonies from achieving their freedom.

Generally speaking, the countries in Latin America achieved political sovereignty at a time when evolutionary or revolutionary demands for economic development did not as yet have an inevitable connotation with political independence.[5] The change of status did not imply radical alterations in the social structure nor in the economic relations with foreign countries.

Mostly, the new American states continued to be governed, politically and economically, by a small dominating class of Spanish or Portuguese ancestry. The ruling class was separated by a social and economic void from their own native populations. The wealth was based - - - and in some cases this is still true — on raising livestock, and producing coffee, sugar, or other staple commodities.

The lack of economic dynamism and the overwhelming importance of staple commodities exports were very much in demand by Latin America's neighbor, the United States, as it was developing into the world's leading industrial power. The variation in prices of the commodities exports — generally in decline and controlled by the import centers — was compensated for by an increase of production. The lack of educational facilities and the small progress in industrialization channeled a large majority of the available labor to agriculture and mining where nonspecialized workers were increasingly desired in order to meet the demands in production. The lack of a social organization gave to the great landowners an overwhelming control of labor costs.

It may be said that the predominant

characteristic of Latin America, at the end of the last century, was of an artificial stability. The status quo satisfied both the foreign interests and the dominating classes.

The acute pessimism expressed by some writers sueh as Arguedas, Encina, and Cunha regarding the social conditions of the people did not find an attentive audience.[6]

As the 20th century moved along, resentment and frustration made its public appearance. The sense of failure of Latin Ameriea to keep pace with the development of nationhood within the framework of the rest of Western society "turned from frustration to protest, from protest to ideology and from ideology to political foree." [7]

The Rise of Nationalism. Two questions may be posed at this point: Which were the stimuli that gave substance to the feelings of resentment and frustration? Can we say that the sense of backwardness was the principal agent in the change of behavior of Latin America's people?

We may find in the last decades of the last century and at the beginning of the 20th century some indications of an incipient revolt in terms of international law doctrine against the legal and military enforcement of foreign economic interests.[8]

Also, a clear indication of a major change in the attitude of the countries in Latin America was the Mexican revolution of 1911. The historical importance of the movement lies in the fact that the landowning oligarchy was eliminated.[9] Althougb the revolution had economic and social bearings, it was also directed against the power of foreign economic interests.[10] The Constitution of 1917 gave a very clear warning to the United States, Great Britain, and other foreign countries of the Mexican feelings regarding national emancipation from external tutelage.[11]

The period after the First World War considerably influenced Latin America's behavior. The need for development of a substitutive industry, its implications on the social patterns, and the influence of the Marxist ideas through the eruption of Communist Parties all over the area were facts with profound implications in the general attitude of the masses. There was a remarkable change in the social and economie character of Latin America between 1900 and 1930, and the new environment was the seedhed in which nationalism germinated and grew.[12]

Professor Akzin, commenting on nationalism, says that from the beginning of the 19th eentury in Europe, a new state of mind has developed into a powerful ideology described as national-mindedness or nationalism. He defines such state of mind as "the consciousness of belonging to a nation, coupled with an active urge to perpetuate and strengthen national bonds by various, ineluding political, means. . . ." [13]

Also, according to Professor Akzin, due to the powerful impact of concentrated methods of indoctrination and propaganda, it is possible in modern times to produce national integration of smaller social units, to crystallize national characteristics, and to stimulate national consciousness in one or two generations.[14]

Latin America had experimented since the 19th century with most of the social philosophies in vogue in European countries. Socialism, communism, and fascism — along with their variants — were reflected in the Latin American political spectrum. However, the European pattern of political ideologies was not relevant to contemporary Latin America's environment. Such condition may explain to a certain extent the failure in South America of the emergenee of the traditional gronpings — Socialists, Communists,

radicals, liberal and conservative parties. At the same time it can be observed that there was a relative success of the "populist movements" with their confusing mixture of nationalism, social reformism, and authoritarian centralism.[15]

The change in social and economic structures in Latin America brought the rise of the middle classes and also, as another product, the urban expansion. The new middle classes were much more conscious of their participation as a distinctive national group than was the old landowning aristocracy. They embodied the characteristics of the national-mindedness explained by Professor Akzin.

The urban expansion, as a consequence of the industrial development, brought into the cities a large amount of workers. Politically, they were attracted by the new middle classes since these were less tradition-conscious, were willing to recognize backwardness at home, and fought for new models of social advancement.[16]

The middle classes were mainly responsible for the crystallization of a nationalistic movement that represented a blend of the feelings of resentment and frustration, of the crude reality of backwardness, and of the ideals of social reform and national consciousness — a blend that was tinted with a sense of urgency.

Professor Whitaker presumes such condition when he writes:

> Nationalism is considered to be a key to understand the most important public problems, such as those related to development and modernization, to the alternative of peaceful reform or violent revolution, to the political and economic integration of the continent, to communist penetration of it and to relations between Latin America and the rest of the world.[17]

It will be appropriate for this discussion to recognize, at this point, that the influence of nationalism had contributed also to the emergence of 20 very distinct nations in Latin America, each of them with an individual sense of natural destiny, a more or less sharply defined concept of its national interests, and a desire to assert its international personality.[18]

The Revolutionary Age. Professor Spanier, commenting on the events after the Second World War, asserts that the international community has been through a period of constant changes, all of them trailed by ferment, turmoil, and violence. Such a "revolutionary age" as he calls it, "comprises three concurrent revolutions: the revolution of military technology, which threatens the extermination of life itself; the permanent revolution of communism which aims at the establishment of a new order; and the revolution of the rising expectations which seeks national independence and a better life for the underdeveloped countries." [19]

Latin America's stage at the end of the Second World War was calm on its surface; in a varying degree, however, the seeds of a revolt were present in all the societies. Also, as one of the consequences of the war, its geographical isolation was gone forever. Likewise, the politico-economical structure, originated in the days of the Monroe Doctrine, had lost its validity, and Latin America became fully exposed to the world's political interplay.

At a quick pace, the countries south of Rio Grande commenced to play an important role in the United Nations where the impotence of the Security Council gave a greater weight to the 20 votes in the General Assembly represented by the Latin American bloc.

The revolution of rising expectations that swept through Asia and Africa with the withdrawal of the colonial powers found in Latin America a warm

response. It was reflected among the masses through the concepts of development, modernization, and social justice.[20] It reinforced the nationalistic drive, and the interactive effects of the three revolutions mentioned by Professor Spanier placed Latin America at a crossroad between an orderly evolution and a violent revolution.

II — THE THREAT

The Early Presence of Communism. Marxist ideas have been present in Latin American countries since before the First World War and were incorporated in the political basis of the existing Socialist Parties. After the Bolshevik revolution and the establishment of the Communist International in 1919, the Socialist Parties of Uruguay, Mexico, and Chile joined the Comintern, while in Argentina a dissident socialist group that had split off in 1918 became the Communist Party.[1]

In Cuba, Costa Rica, Brazil, Peru, Paraguay, Equador, and Colombia the parties were organized in the middle or late 1920's. Venezuela and Panama had their Communist Parties formed during the 1930's. In most countries of Central America like Haiti, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, the parties came into being in the middle 1940's. The latest Communist Parties to be formed were in Bolivia and Honduras during the last decade.[2]

A Latin American Secretariat was created in 1924, and 5 years later the first regional Communist Party Congress was held in Buenos Aires.[3]

An analysis of the influence of communism in the political events of Latin America up to 1940 will present very few positive results. Although the parties were active in most of the countries, the ideology they embraced did not influence noticeably the behavior of the local societies. The Latin American governments maintained a very careful control of the Communist subversive activities, and, generally speaking, the parties were outlawed during most of the period considered. Since they received mandatory orientation from Moscow, it may be assumed that the Soviets had little understanding of the Latin American environment or that within the global Soviet policy Latin America held a low priority.[4]

In the late 1930's, as a result of the defeat of the Spanish Republicans, many Communists migrated to Latin America. Their skill and operational experience were very useful in strengthening the parties as well as in breaking up the bureaucratic structure that prevailed in those organizations.[5]

During the period of the Second World War the Soviet Union posed as a worthy ally of the Western Powers. The feelings towards the Soviet Union, at that time, may be well represented by the words of President Roosevelt's closest adviser following the Yalta Conference: "... The Russians have proved that they could be reasonable and far-seeing and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the President or any of us that we could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine." [6]

The support given to such an image by the communications media of the Allied Powers provided an opportunity for communism to increase its strength in Latin America. Many of the Communist Parties were given legal status which enabled them to participate in the political life of the country. Soviet Embassies became the focal points of an intensive propaganda campaign which highlighted the achievements of the Soviet Union both in the war and in the outstanding development of their country.

The Cold War. The years following the Second World War were characterized by the obsolescence of the tradition, criteria, and the concepts of the classic international system that had been in existence up to that time. To fill the vacuum created by such obsolescence, new formulas had to be developed.

Three doctrines were involved in the shaping of the new international environment. The United States strongly proposed a harmonic structure based on a pacific society of nation-states, reflecting the democratic ideas of the system of government in the United States. This doctrine was included in the fundamental concept of the United Nations.

The second doctrine to be considered is communism. Its notion of a classless society and the Marxist principal theory that capitalism is evil and must be destroyed embodied, in practice, the fundamental goals of the Soviet Union — the protection of the areas already under its control, and, in a further step, the increase of its zone of influence.

The third doctrine embraced the ideals of an anti-colonial world, and it was linked with the emergence of new national states coming from colonial or semi-independent status, all of them aspiring to the total attributes of national sovereignty. Although many of them did not have the effective minimum conditions of national power, when compared with older states, they came to be one of the most influencing factors in the development of a new system of international relations.[7]

Communism and democracy were represented by the two superpowers in the world. Anticolonialism, valuable as an aspiration, could not provide the necessary base for the achievement of adequate levels of political and economic development in the many emergent nation-states.

It is possible at this point to observe the connotations between the three concurrent revolutions, mentioned by Professor Spanier, with those doctrines. The revolution of military technology, when related to the confrontation between the two ideologies, communism and democracy, established the pattern within which would take place the interplay of national interests of every nation-state in the world arena.

Always taking the initiative, the Communists forced the United States to compete with them on grounds of their choosing. The manipulation, to their own benefit, of the socio-economic problems of the underdeveloped countries was the basic strategem of communism. The revolution of rising expectations, a byproduct of the anti-colonialism doctrine, was, therefore, directly influenced by such ideological conflict and power contest.

The cold war period represents, as a consequence, "a struggle over how the developing nations can best be modernized, a test of the relative efficiency and acceptability of evolution and democracy versus violent revolution and Communist dictatorship." [8]

The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, according to Professor Etzioni, is "motivated in part by humanist considerations (being 'have countries' in a world of 'have nots'), in part by a search for trade advantages, or, protection of investment, and in part by considerations of justice, power and security." [9]

The Appeal of Communism. Communism's most strategic exports to underdeveloped countries are ideas. "In their attempts to influence the peoples of such countries the Communists put great emphasis, even chief emphasis, on appeals, not the material wants of man, but rather, to the human desire for status, equality, freedom from domination or oppression, espe-

cially domination by foreigners." [10]

The discussion held in Chapter I has shown that the Latin American countries arrived, by the end of the Second World War, at a condition where an urgent but orderly evolution or a violent revolution were the only two alternatives left to meet the increasing demauds for soeial justice, economic development, and modernization.

To a broad segment of the Latin American public many Communist views and proposals for social, economic, aud political changes seem neither unreasonable nor radical. These views and proposals, however, are not the exclusive product of communisu as a doctrine or as a system of government.

Many people, in addition to the Communists — and certainly not influenced by them — protest that in Latin America social justice is inadequate, political freedom is sometimes restricted, full national sovereignty is shaded by foreign interests, and there is insufficient economic development. It seems clear that even without the Communist presenee much of the revolutionary program they advocate would be pursued in Latin America.[11]

Vice President Humphrey, writiug on the subject, states that "Marxism as a guide to social development is a spent force in most European eountries, but it remains a lively alternative in Latin Americea today." [12]

Surrounded by poverty and social injustice, being exposed to the "demonstration effect," the average Latin American caunot be completely indifferent to the pseudoenchantments of a doctrine which promises a better social order and the improvement of his economic conditions. He is told that both the Soviet Union and Communist China achieved in a few decades a spectacular development, and he is aware of some aspeets of that progress.[13]

On the other hand, his own government explains that development plans are in execution; social laws have been presented for Congressional approval, or already have been implemented by the Executive; that democracy is a better form of government; and communism is evil. His own situation and the knowledge of the past do uot help him very much in visualizing such an image.

Many times he is exposed to the fact that for political reasons, or foreign influence, some of those who preach change are labeled as Communists, although he firmly believes that they are patriots. Professor Andreski commenting on this aspect of the problem states that:

> The habit of branding as communist everybody who opposes entrenched privileges helps the real communists a great deal as it bestows upon Communism a certain aura of saintly martyrdom, makes many people disbelieve the truth about communist manoeuvers, helps the real secret agents to camouflage their activities and establishes in the minds of a large section of the public a link between opposition to communism and subservience to vested interests.[14]

The exploitation of existing antagonisms and the amplification of possible deficiencies of the governments are vital elements in the Communist strategic plan. They facilitate a better illustration of the advantages of communism. Also, they provide an excellent opportunity for turning the forces of change, already existent, against the interests of the Uuited States.

The Anti-Yankeeism. It has been said that "the history of relationships among the Americas is replete with shocking mistakes by the United States and with equally reprehensihle actions by Latin American nations against each other and against the United States." [15]

The augmentatiou of those mistakes towards a morc deep anti-U.S. sentiment is one of the basic aims of communism in Latin America.

Two approaches may be uscd to explain the rcasons for the existencc of such feelings: thc historical approach and the sociological one. Both have to he examined in order to perccive the basis of the Communist strategy.

Since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the relationships between the United States and Latin American countries have passed through periods of warm friendship and bitter resentments. The expansionist program of the United States expressed as the "Manifest Destiny," or the economic and diplomatic pressures exerted to conquer Latin American markets for the manufactured goods produced by the expanding industry in the United States, the procedure employed for the control of the Panama Canal, and the issue of the corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine by Theodore Roosevelt in 1903 and 1904. All of those events marked profoundly the attitude of Latin America towards its already powerful neighhor.[16]

The continuous interventions in Central America motivated hy the national interests of the United States produced its configuration as an imperialistic country to the eyes of Latin America. During the 1920's fear and suspicion of the United States rose to an ever greater pitch. By 1928, however, the consequences of the situation were felt not only south of Rio Grande but also in North America. Religious and political sectors in the United States devised a moral issue in the question of intervention and had commenced to denounce the practice of imperialism.[17]

The events of the Sixth Pan-American Conference at Havana in 1928 clearly demonstrated that the hemispheric cohesion was "on the brink of an angry disruption which might endanger not only the United States political interests but considerable commercial interests as well." [18]

The "good neighbor" policy proposed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt produced a reasonable change of attitudes between the Amcrican nations. The definition of "good ncighbor" as the one who "resolutely respects himself and becausc he does so, respects the rights of others" was in consonance with the Latin American mood.[19]

The Second World War brought the whole continent together against the common cnemy. Regional collective security agreements were adopted, and a sentiment of cohesion marked the relationships hetween the American countries.[20] However, those friendly relations and the cooperation which existed during the war years tended to disappear after 1948.

Two major facts determined the decline of the cohesion between the American countries: the cold war and the world economic conditions prevailing after 1948.

The sharp decline in the prices of primary raw materials and the high interest rates involved in loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund caused intense criticism in Latin America. Such feelings were directed against Washington mainly because the United States, absorhed by the cold war policies, could not grasp the real economic situation in Latin America.

Professor Burr assumes such condition when he says: "Washington's advocacy of unfettered free enterprise for Latin America merely proved, in the eyes of crities, that the United States was abysmally ignorant of Latin American economic problems. What was good for the United States in the nineteenth century, was not, they insisted, good for Latin America in the twentieth." [21]

Within the cold war two events in-

fluenced also the reappearance of the U.S. imperialistic image: the Bay of Pigs incident and the House of Representatives Resolution of 1965.

The attempted invasion of Cuba in 1961, with all its contradictions, damaged the prestige of the United States before the other American nations to whom the incident was considered as a flagrant violation of the existing inter-American agreements of nonintervention.

The Dominican Republic intervention aroused doubts as to whether there was a real and urgent Communist threat to justify the unilateral action. The sequence of events that followed such intervention proved that many of the Latin American countries considered justified and adequate the steps taken by the United States.

No doubts, however, were left about the willingness of the United States to violate the Charter of OAS when the House of Representatives in September of 1965 adopted a resolution calling for the unilateral use of force against any threat of communism in the hemisphere.[22]

The anti-Yankeeism feeling analyzed from the psychological angle may be basically understood as the reaction of poverty against wealth.

The official propaganda of the United States, the American Way of Life, contributes very much to accentuate the large differences between both parts of the hemisphere. When compared with the Communist countries, a different projection is obtained. Because of the restrictions of foreign travel and the rigid control over the Russians and Chinese abroad by the Party — and also indicating a keen psychological strategy — the image of opulence cannot be linked with the Communist countries.

It does not require too much ingenuity to equate wealth with imperialistic exploitation and, at the same time, to compare ways of living.

Anti-Yankeeism is also a source of many comforts. Not only does it masquerade the feelings of guilt derived from the knowledge that the actual conditions in Latin America are likewise a consequence of the Latin American shortcomings, but it promotes social cohesion since it is one of the few political sentiments spread throughout the area.

Anti-Yankeeism helps, when it assumes the character of an obsession, to distract some governments and more decisively the societies from the strenuous and difficult road they have to follow in order to achieve all the desired social and economic goals.[23]

Perhaps its use is calculated to exploit the conviction that "something is wrong" — which is true — while simultaneously placing the blame at some cursed foreigner. "For the many adherents of the conspiratorial view of history the charge 'imperialist' plays in Latin America a role identical to the cry 'communist' in the United States." [24]

The Jacobin Mode. The advent of the Castro government in Cuba opened a new chapter in the history of the Communist movement in Latin America. It not only provided the opportunity for the establishment of the first Communist regime in the hemisphere, but it also allowed the Communist Parties to evolve from a position of political isolation.

It was, by all aspects, a victory for communism. The consequences of such victory, however, were not completely satisfactory. The noisy and turbulent actions of Castro and Guevara and the warm responses from the radical nationalists in Latin America altered the pattern of action planned by the Kremlin strategists.

As a direct result of Cuba's revolution, Latin America has seen the emer-

gence of the Jacobin Left, including the political parties and groups which favor social revolution at whatever cost and are excessively nationalistic to the point of xenophobia.[25]

The presence of the Jacobins has had a very noticeable effect on the hemisphere's Communist movement. It seems, also, that the future effects of that presence will be greater because the ultimate goals of the Jacobins do not exactly coincide with the philosophy of the Kremlin, which seeks to guarantee the existing power position of the Soviet Union and, slowly but certainly, to weaken its major opponent — the United States.

The split between Moscow and Peking on the methods for achievement of the basic goal of communism is reflected in the programs proposed by the traditional Communists and the Jacobins. The criticism of the advocates of a new and more active form of activity is expressed by Regis Debray commenting on the Cuban revolution: "On the theoretical plane the revolution has rehabilitated Marxism in Latin America, by its triumph in practice." According to the same author "Marxism has been lost between two forms of discredit: APRA and mechanical Marxism, without contact with national reality." [26,27]

The experience of Cuba, according to Debray, "has demonstrated that the old Marxism was no longer any good, that it was necessary to recover the revolutionary inspiration of Marxism-Leninism and to submit Marxism once again to the reality of class action." [28]

The Soviet Union is well aware of the strength of the Jacobins in Latin America. They represent a radical nationalism which naturally is antiforeign. The Soviets are in a favorable position to exploit the antiforeign sentiment in Latin America at the expense of the U.S. Supporting national liberation movements and encouraging, when possible, the native Communist Parties to cooperate with the nationalist movements, Moscow is "swimming with the tide." Such policy, although it does not envisage an early transition of the Latin American States to communism, has the virtue of avoiding embarrassing complications for the Soviet Union.[29]

Defending that position on a world basis, Moscow argues that the methods proposed by Mao Tse-tung will lead inevitably to a global nuclear war. "To follow Mao's path would not mean to gain time for Socialism at the expense of bloodshed but to lose both time and blood, to lose so much time and so much blood that it would be difficult to imagine a worse path." [30]

The concept of peaceful coexistence — without losing from view the struggle against capitalism — is Moscow's basic proposition. "Peaceful coexistence does not imply a relaxation of the struggle of the working classes and the Communist parties for the triumph of the socialist ideas. . . . What it implies is that ideological and political disputes should not be settled by war." [31]

In Latin America, Moscow followers not only accept such a theory but also, where possible, try to slow down the more violent Jacobin actions. Debray mentions that: "Sad to say in some countries, revolutionary groups, which are in the midst of serious preparations for the armed struggle, feel that they are under observation and are more persecuted by these Marxist-Leninist parties, from which many of them came, than they are even by the repressive agencies." [32]

The force of Jacobinism is on the rise in Latin America and can be expected to produce revolutionary movements in the countries where a dynamic, nationalistic leadership fails to produce the basic results in economic development and social reforms.

Divergencies in the approaches to the communization of Latin America, the search for consistencies and inconsistencies of the ideological basis of commnnism will have no significance at all if, as a final result, new Cubas emerge in the Communist world.

III — MEETING THE THREAT

The Scope of the Discussiou. This chapter deals with a broad appreciation of the proccsses and forces that oppose communism in Latin America.

Some of those forees and processes may be classified as *natural* sinee they are normal components of Latin American environment or hecause they are inherent to the common man south of Rio Grande. In addition, some processes may he labeled as *artificial* since they were established to confrout the threat of communism or to eliminate a set of conditions that would create an ideal environment for the spread of the Communist credo in Latin America.

Obviously, there is a very deep interaction betweeu those forees and processes. Also, some of them react directly, on a day-by-day basis, to external and internal influences. Others, having a standby meaning or a long-range effect, present a slower reaction to the changes of scenario outside and inside their field of action.

The discussion will cover the political systems in Latin America; the influence of the Church and the military; and the posture of nationalism — all of them natnral forces and processes. Likewise, it will include a snrvey of the influeuce of the Organization of American States, the Alliance for Progress, and foreign aid programs which represent the proccsses devcloped to deal with the Communist threat.

The Political Systems in Latin America. The meaning of a political system, as proposed by Professor Beer, is of a strnctnre which performs a certain function for a society, that is, to make legitimatc policy decisions.[1] Those decisions represent eonrses of action directed at more or less clearly conceived goals. Legitimacy connotes the understanding and acceptance, to some extent, by the members of the society, of those decisions as being in conformity with their concepts of authority and purpose.[2]

Within this definition of politieal system four variable patterns may be considered: political culture, power, interests, and policy. Those variable patterns are interdcpendents, and each of them will react noticeably at any change in the others.[3]

A perusal of Latin America's political culture, in order to answer the questions of how the governments ought to be conducted and what they should try to do, will show that traditionally the ideals and values of democracy have deep roots in the culture and, by and large, influence it.[4]

All of the Latin American constitutions — and in the last 150 years they have been rewritten many times — include the guarantees of individual lihcrty as the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition. Religious freedom is proclaimed. Universal suffrage is stated in its most liberal sense, and sovercignty is vested in the people. The minute enumeration of the inalienable rights of the individual is inspired by a dcsire to erect a constitutional barrier to tyranny.[5]

It has been said, however, that in reality such constitutions represent, at best, declarations of ideal aspirations.[6]

The actual economic and social patterns in Latin America, with their implicatious in the educational field, may produce, in some instances, a sense of inconsistency when comparing the re-

alities of Latin America's political structure with the constitutional provisions. It is necessary to understand, however, that those ideal aspirations include the cherished values and beliefs of Latin American societies since the independence period. They represent one of the basic goals to be achieved as a consequence of the actual revolutionary process in Latin America.

The understanding of the political culture must include the analysis of the emotional attitudes which influence the societies. "The laws of a country," says Burke, "without a basis in emotion are weakly founded being supported only by their own terror and by the concern which each individual may find in them from his own private speculations or can spare to them from his own private interests." [7]

The consolidation of those emotional attitudes as an understandable and influential agent in the political culture of Latin America took form in recent decades. In Chapter I, nationalism was examined from a broad point of view and some aspects of its development and general influence in the actual behavior of Latin American societies were considered. At this point it will be necessary to examine the position of nationalism as related to the concept of a political culture pattern.

The emergence of nationalism, it was mentioned before, is closely connected with the urban explosion and the emergence of the new middle classes. Those events created the social communication links which permitted the transference from the cultural elite to the lower classes, the peasant and workers, of a more detailed view of the concepts built in in the so-called ideal constitutions.

The broader understanding of something that, subconsciously, was already known produced a great potential of emotional attitudes towards the practical achievement of those constitutional principles. It includes values and beliefs totally opposed to the configuration of the existing Communist societies. It outlines the answers of how the governments ought to be conducted and what has to be done.

Nationalism has been the main receiver of the strength derived from the emotional attitudes' potential in the sense that nationalism represents the medium through which those ideals will be achieved. Within this concept nationalism is a constructive and positive ingredient, and it establishes a solid barrier against any Communist pretenses.

The Patterns of Power. The consideration of the second variable in the concept of a political system — the patterns of power — includes an analysis of how the political decisions are made, the concept of authority, how the leaders are chosen, and what interests they have in their struggle for power.[8]

Personalism is a very strong element in the political life of Latin America. The tendency to give personal loyalty to an individual has facilitated the creation of "strong man" governments and simultaneously impeded the establishment of impersonal political parties.[9]

Vargas in Brazil, Peron in Argentina, and, more recently, Castro in Cuba are valid examples of such personalism. The sense of appreciation and acceptance of a charismatic leader surpasses the value and the significance of the ideals he advocates, and it eventually overcomes, for a reasonable period of time, the consensus on individual rights and representative form of government.

Every one of the populist movements in Latin America included a mixture of nationalism, social reformism, and authoritarian centralism. Also, "even

the harshest dictators customarily attempt to clothe themselves in legal legitimacy and to talk in the name of democracy. This pose is not a mere farce; it conditions future actions most importantly." [10]

It is interesting to observe that personal rule in Latin America has never been institutionalized. The dormant effect caused by the personal magnetism of the ruler is temporary and, sooner or later, in most of the States, the democratic spirit has contended with the concept of absolute centralized control.[11]

Under both democratic and dictatorial regimes the preponderance of power rests with the chief of state. This, in part, explains the strongman image of executive authority in Latin America.

Political Parties in Latin America. It may be said that the consolidation of political parties as clear representatives of an ideology or of a definite political orientation has become a major feature of Latin American political life.[12] The attainment of such consolidation, however, is still incomplete, being hampered by the prevailing environmental conditions.

Among other functions, political parties organize the electorate for their periodic interventions in decisionmaking. This organization implies a stabilized society whereas the groups or classes are more or less attracted by the ideology represented or by the social and economic goals defended by the party.

The velocity of Latin American social change and the rapid growth of the middle classes have been mainly responsible for the lack of definition in the purposes and programs of the existing political parties. Likewise, personalism still affects party organization, although a clear movement towards an impersonal basis in some common interest or ideology has been present in the last decades.[13]

It is possible, for the purposes of this discussion, to consider the political parties' spectrum in Latin America divided into three broad areas. The area of the democratically oriented traditionalist parties, that generally represent the upper classes, is composed of liberals and conservatives. They have been playing politics since the 19th century — mainly at the theoretical level. Basic problems related to social integration, illiteracy, or economic development were always considered in very vague terms. More recently they were joined by the moderate radical parties embracing older elite segments, professionals, government employees, and businessmen. Also, the non-Communist socialist parties came into this group. Although the recent additions express more dynamism regarding the basic problems, their approach is theoretical and does not normally include the necessary structural changes.

The Populist Parties and the Christian Democrats, representing the second group, who are also democratic in their general line of reasoning. Populist Parties advocate the need of finding Latin American solutions for Latin American countries. They do not base their political programs on any particular religious credo. Although some of those parties adopt Marxist ideas regarding social reforms, they are democratic in the sense that they advocate the choosing of governments by the electoral process and the preservation of the rights of political minorities.

Christian Democratic parties seek to implement the principles of social and economic justice embodied in the papal encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Matter et Magistra.* They advocate meaningful land reform and support anti-imperialist policies, including the nationaliza-

tion of those foreign controlled resources that do not contribute to domestic development. Their importance derives from the fact that they operate within a framework of traditional religious and social values at the same time that their programs embrace nationalism and reformism. Middle classes and the working classes are the groups in which their influences have been more impressive.[14]

The third area of Latin America's political spectrum comprises the totalitarian parties, Jacobins and Communists, already discussed in Chapter II.

The broad analysis of the two groups of political parties — conservatives and Christian Democrats-Populists — may lead to the conclusion that democratic solutions would be the normal path for the revolutions of rising expectations in Latin America. It is necesary, however, to consider that there exists in the region a resilient traditional strncture of institutions, hierarchical arrangements, and attitudes whieh still influence every aspect of Latin American political behavior. Such traditionalism has recently "not only resisted the impact of technological innovation and industrialization but it appears to have been strengthened by it." [15]

The Patterns of Interests. The confrontation between the interests of the old dominant groups and the new classes striving for social reforms and economic development generates great reactions within the political systems. Two solutions are proposed for the achievement of the necessary reforms: through a continuous but nevertheless slow progress by democratic processes as it has been advocated by the Christian Democrats and some Populist Parties; or through the violent revolution preached by the Jacobins with its connotations of communism.

The pattern of interests is conditioned by the fact that the evolutionary process in Latin America is irreversible and compelling and, in one way or another, will supplant traditionalism. In such an environment two forces have a special predicament: the military and the Church. Both influence and are largely affected by the evolutionary process.

Generally speaking, the armed forces have been participating to a certain degree in the configuration of the Latin American political systems. Such an attitude has been influenced by the prevailing conditions in every country and, except for a few reprehensible events, the military has, since the independence period, demonstrated an increasing degree of social consciousness and political responsibility.

During the last century and the first decades of the 20th century, the military have lived within the political framework of Latin America's reality. They were conservatives and the normal supporters of the local oligarchies. More recently they have been recruited on a broader class basis, mainly from the new middle classes. They reflect today, as a component of the social structure, the progressive ideals of social reform, economic development, and nationalism. Also, and most importantly, they share the democratic ideals of Latin American societies.

The military establishment in Latin America represents one of the most reliable deterrent weapons against communism, and it is interesting to observe that this attribute does not belong particularly to a Latin American environment. "In the most striking cases where a Communist regime has come into power, its advent has been preceded by the collapse of military authority. Russia, Nationalist China and Cuba are clear examples of such condition." [16]

The role of the military in the Latin America's political scenario in recent

times has been that of a multiple-purpose instrument; it acts as a safety valve, venting excessively passionate emotions accumulated in the struggle for reforms; as a brake, to check inroads made by the totalitarian parties; and as a booster, increasing the speed of the process towards the goals of social reform and economic development.

The Influence of the Catholic Church. Although the degree of participation of the Church in the evolutionary process in Latin America varies largely from country to country, its influence is worthy of mentioning.

In spite of the fact that the great majority of Latin Americans are, at least formally, members of the Roman Catholic Church, this did not contribute, up to the late 1930's, to an involvement of the Church in the social and economic problems affecting all the societies in Latin America. Up to that time the Church seemed to be much more concerned with maintaining its temporal status than with the material claims of its believers. That attitude produced a very close relationship with the oligarchies and all forms of government as long as those regimes and groups did not interfere with the Church's own privileges. The maintenance of the status quo implied a strong opposition from the Church against any movement for social, economic, and political reformers.[17]

Since the end of the Second World War, radical changes have been observed in the Church's behavior in Latin America. At least three factors have determined such transformation: the modernization process, both ideological and structural, of the Roman Catholic Church pressed upon by Pope John XXIII (1958-1963) and the current Pope Paul VI; the influence of such progressive Catholic writers as Henry Bergson, Francois Mauriac, and Jacques Maritain; and, finally, the acknowledgment that the increasing acceptance of Protestantism by the workers and peasant classes was a direct result of the meaningless position adopted by the Catholic Church in Latin America.

The encyclicals *Matter et Magistra* (1961) and *Pacem in Terris* (1963) reflect the same social orientation given by Leo XIII in the *Rerum Novarum*. They represent, however, a practical approach based on the experience gained through the participation of Catholicism in the political and social affairs of European countries in the last three decades.[18]

The establishment of Christian Democratic Parties in Latin America and their rising importance derives, among other things, from those attitudes adopted by Catholic leadership, as well as from the experience of similar parties in Europe in the struggle against communism.

The influence of conditions prevailing in Latin America has provoked the growth of a radical Catholic group comprised of both clergymen and laymen. Advocating an extreme nationalism, they have been accusing foreign Protestant missionaries of being agents of Yankee imperialism, as a process for the prevention of a larger influence of Protestantism.[19] They are disputing with the Jacobins the leadership of the revolutionary movement towards social and economic changes, and this struggle is for control of the working and peasant classes.

The Artificial Processes for the Containment of Communism. The concept of Pan-Americanism, since it was proposed by Simon Bolivar, has been influenced not only by extraeontinental events but also by the national interests of all American countries.

The Act of Chapultepec in 1945 represented the net result of concurrent poli-

cies developed since 1933 in order to change the pattern of interventionism adopted by the United States in an early period. It meant, also, the clear acceptance by all the American nations of the existence of a common threat and the firm determination for a collective action against such a threat. The Rio Treaty (1947) and the Charter of the Organization of the American States (1948) represent the next step in inter-American relations. The option of using two separate treaties to deal both with the traditional form of aggression and the insidious process of Communist subversion was considered by some American nations, but the final decision resulted in a single instrument of collective action.[20] The multipurpose characteristic attributed to the regional system had important effects on its future actions.

It may be considered a "cruel twist of fate that upon the eve of the birth of the Organization of the American States the ideas that nourished its conception and gestation had begun to lose validity." [21]

The ideals of regionalism, enthusiastically defended by the Latin Americans during the elaboration of the United Nations Charter, lost some of their meaning in the world's actual environment with America's most powerful nation involved in a global strategy.[22] This condition projected clearly the ambiguities existing both in the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the OAS, since the two documents represented a compromise between the interests of Latin America in binding the United States to a policy of nonintervention and the last effects of the "good neighbor" policy on the national interests of the powerful North American nation.[23]

As a consequence, the actions of the Organization of American States against communism have been marked by a very cautious approach. The preventive attitudes assumed by the United States in the interest of its national security, although approved by the OAS in a followthrough pattern, have provoked considerable reactions all over the continent.

The Alliance for Progress is the most recent process established in order to improve the social and economic conditions of Latin America. It came into existence, oddly enough, as a consequence of Castro's triumph in Cuba. Together with the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank, they represent a radical change of attitude by the United States towards Latin America.[24]

The Alliance for Progress in theory offers an ideological basis for the economic and social development of Latin America. It appeals for the frontal attack on the problem of economic development, the quest for social justice through reforms, and the maintenance and perfecting of democratic institutions.[25]

The Alliance, viewed as an ideology, cannot be considered very successful after 7 years of existence. Many opinions have been expressed on the causes for the lack of enthusiastic and effective participation of the American countries in this program that "would transform the American continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts." [26] The theory that the Alliance was conceived in ignorance, or the negative attitudes prevailing in Latin America against it, are typical explanations for the lack of success.[27]

Latin American attitudes, according to Roberto Campos, may be classified as follows: first, an expectation of magic results generally followed by frustration and resentment; second, an immobilizing incredulity; third, the ideological opposition from certain Marxist groups; fourth, the hegemonic opposition on the part of some politicians; and, finally, the opportunis-

tic actions by certain other political groups.[28]

The Alliance concept, along with the recognition of the need for economic development, expressed some presuppositions related to the social environment of Latin America. It acknowledged the need for a social transformation, while at the same time assuming that such transformation could be accomplished without recourse to revolution. Implicit in this consideration was the idea that the necessary changes could be introduced with enough speed to prevent the outburst of interfering revolutionary movements.[29]

The validity of those presuppositions depends upon the prevailing conditions of every country, and it had to take in account the reactions of the groups which the social transformation would affect. On the other hand, the rate at which the necessary social changes are introduced influences the effectiveness of the economic development programs. Ambassador Linowitz expresses the interaction of the social and economic evolutionary processes saying that: "Economic progress alone cannot be the key to the future of Latin America. Economic progress may be the body and muscle of the Alliance, but social progress must be its heart and soul." [30]

Despite the criticisms, the Alliance for Progress has contributed effectively to the improvement of the social and economic conditions in Latin America, and, in the long run, is contributing to the reinforcement of the regional barrier against communism. The adherence to the principle of effective planning to solve the main issues as advocated by the Alliance's administration, prior to the allocation of funds for its execution, has introduced a radical change in the old political-effect programs and as such is influencing positively the process of modernization in Latin America.

According to Professor Feis, the general assumption in the United States regarding foreign aid was that offer of economic assistance would be convincing evidence of the U. S. wish to see the underdeveloped world grow strong and prosper; the recognition of such attitude had to be friendship from those countries towards the United States.[31]

The establishment of a foreign aid program, however, includes a set of obvious rules defining policies for the donors and obligations from the recipients. The influence of the cold war, the global strategy, and the national interests of the United States have to be present in such dealings.

As far as Latin America is concerned, the procedures involved in the granting of foreign aid were not understood, and Latin Americans have repeatedly declared that they are not seeking aid in the sense of the term, and if they were, it should not be given them.[32]

On the other hand, the criteria adopted for the granting of foreign aid in the first decade after the Second World War accentuated the impression in Latin America that, for them, the foreign aid was a deed of mercy. In the decade 1945-1955, Latin America received only 2.4 percent of the whole United States foreign aid program whereas the Middle East and Africa received 8.7 percent and the non-Communist countries in Asia more than 20 percent.[33]

Both as a process for reflecting the interest of the United States in the improvement of the local conditions, as well as a method for the achievement of that improvement, the foreign aid programs did not produce satisfactory results in Latin America.

IV — THE BRAZILIAN NORTHEAST: A CASE STUDY

The Reasons for an Example. It has been said in the foregoing discussion that generalizations about Latin America tend to be both artificial and superficial. With this knowledge in mind, the problems related to social and economic backwardness, the Communist threat, and the discussion of the forces and processes in use to confront all of those diseases were presented in a tentative broad basis and with the possible attention to prevent inadequate generalizations.

The discussion of a specific case would give a more detailed view of all those problems and, probably, some useful conclusions could be drawn on the adequacy and feasibility of the forces and processes being used to deter communism.

The area under consideration represents a major component of Latin America, both in size and population, and the history of its settlement goes back to the early 1500's. Likewise, in recent years, the danger of a takeover by the Castro-Communist-inspired peasant leagues projected over the Brazilian Northeast has received attention from the entire hemisphere.[1]

The Historical and Economic Background. The Brazilian Northeast was the first area to be settled by the Portuguese. By the middle of the 16th century, sugarcane had been imported from the Azores, and some 50 years later cities like Olinda and Salvador had become the outlets of the expanding sugar industry. Since there was a shortage of Indian labor, Negro slaves were imported from Africa.

The social and economic organization was based in the *engenho*. Each engenho was almost a world in itself with its sugar mill run by waterpower or by animals; with the Big House and the slave shed; with its own Church and cemetery; and the plantation spreading all around. The engenho was the principal economic institution of the Northeast; the villages and towns were but an extension of the engenho without independence of action.[2]

Colonial society in Brazil, principally in Pernambuco and Bahia, according to Freyre, "evolved patriarchally and aristocratically not at random and in unstable groups, but in the shadow of the great sugar plantations."[3]

The development of the southern regions, the abolition of slavery in 1888, the modernization of the sugar production process, and the tough competition for markets were the main factors that contributed to the decline of the Northeast's economy.

The way of life engendered by the engenho, however, did not entirely disappear, and the aristocratic, paternalistic, and semifeudal society subsisted up to recent years. That society had created a lower class dependent upon the upper classes whose members were expected to protect their followers out of a sense of noblesse oblige.[4] On the other hand, the political scenario of the region was characterized — and this was valid up to the last decade — by the complete obedience of the majority of the lower classes to some of the representatives or descendants of the landowners.

The Drought Polygon. Normally the Northeast is considered to be a single geographical area. In reality, it is composed of three very distinct regions: the coastal strip, some 50 miles wide, where the cycle of the sugar plantations was developed; the drought polygon where a grazing economy took form in the colonial days; and the Sao Francisco valley, where the so-called national integration river cuts through the arid Northeast.

The drought polygon is a special disaster area subject to periodic droughts. Rainfall is very irregular

and scarce, and the periods of drought may last from 1 to 3 years. In this area, however, live some 13 million people exposed to a complete loss of livelihood several times in their lifetime.[5]

It is rather difficult to understand such inconsistency, principally when one is aware that the immense Brazilian territory is not fully settled. The concept of regionalism is perhaps a key factor to explain the Northeast environment. More than 400 years of settlement have adapted ecologically the *sertanejo* to the way of life in the drought polygon.[6]

Another important characteristic of the sertanejo is the migratory pattern. A considerable percentage of the population is constantly involved in some form of migratory movement. Every year large numbers of sertanejos leave their homes to participate in the harvests of the coastal region. Others take part in the migratory movements which involve absences from home of 2 to 3 years. A significant portion of rural labor in Sao Paulo and the building industry in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo is performed by temporary emigrants from the Northeast.

The Evolutional Pattern of a Crisis. The arid Northeast is a region marked by the rise of fanatic religious movements. The dramatic history of the village of Canudos where, during many years up to 1896, the fanatics led by Antonio Conselheiro — Anthony the Counselor — battled the Federal troops well represents the importance of such religious movements. Father Cicero of the village of Juazeiro, in the state of Ceara, was another religious leader. Although excommunicated by the Church, he was the spiritual and political leader in the region during the first decades of the 20th century.

Those movements were also mixed with resentment against the legal authority who was considered to be responsible for all the evils.[7] There was a cause for such feelings. Every time a prolonged drought disturbed the living conditions in the area, official actions were taken to confront the crisis. Those actions, however, were of a short duration. Unfinished dams stood all over the region; some of them were under construction since the monarchy period. Grandiloquent promises were made during election periods, to be forgotten some months later. The semirigid feudal structure was strong enough to eliminate any dissensions, and although the reflux of migrants brought, from more advanced centers, new ideas of economic and social behavior, their impact was absorbed by the local environment.

Communism made its appearance in the Northeast in the late 1920's. Recife, as the main port for the international traffic, has, since that time, raised a small but well organized Communist group, basically composed of the harbour workers. Again, as it was mentioned in Chapter 11, the Communists did not achieve a profound penetration in the masses up to the Second World War. The influence of religion and the social heritage may have prevented a rising of discontentment derived from Communist stimulus.

There is one event, however, that seems to contradict that assertion. In 1935 a Communist upheaval took the city of Natal — Rio Grande do Norte — and during 4 days it dominated some of the populated areas surrounding the State's capital. A national-type Communist government was organized which proclaimed its "liberation" from the Brazilian Government.

The analysis of the episode revealed that in spite of its Communist stamp and of the goals it proposed to achieve, no response was reflected by the local population. President Cafe Filho, a Northeasterner himself, in his memoirs,

referring to the incident, says that when at Rio de Janeiro, as a member of the House of Representatives, he heard about the insurrection, he could not believe it. "It was absurd" he states, "that the communists in Rio Grande do Norte, so few in numbers, could overtake a State." [8]

His experience as a former chief of police in Natal made him well acquainted with the local Communist organization. The main Communist cell was, in reality, largely composed of the ratings of the Federal troops based in Natal. The causes for the upheaval were, according to President Cafe Filho, the passionate political ambience in the State caused by recent elections, including the discharging of large numbers of state employees by the new government, and the discontentment provoked in the Federal garrison by the disciplinary actions taken by its commanding officer.[9] Those facts were cleverly used by the Communist Party. The local population, however, stood apart from the movement, and 4 days later, without the occurrence of other successful upheavals in the country, with the impassivity of the population and Federal action, the Communist movement broke up completely.

During the period of the Second World War the Northeast assumed an important strategic position. The remote possibility of its use as a beachhead for the victorious German Armies in Europe, and later on its importance to air travel to Africa, brought the coastal cities to the immediate attention of the Brazilian Government as well as that of the United States. The volume of resources applied in the construction of military facilities and the inflow of large numbers of personnel changed the static way of life of Natal, Fortaleza, Recife, and Salvador and had a profound influence in the social and economic structure of the region.

The Peasant Leagues. The failure of the old family plantations in competing successfully within the world market for the export of sugar, cotton and cacao resulted in the transformation of the plantations into essentially commercial enterprises. Consequently, a new type of proletariat made its appearance in the Northeast. It was composed of semiskilled and unskilled workers who were paid wages and received some social benefits. They were no longer considered, however, as members of the old patriarchal family.[10]

As another form of enterprise, small portions of land were rented to the peasants, the fees being paid generally in agricultural production. In both cases the new rural lower classes did not have political leadership and the government was not fully effective in meeting their psychological and social needs.

In 1955 a new movement made its appearance in the Northeast. Peasant tenants on a property in Pernambuco organized themselves into a society to protest the steeply rising rents charged by the absentee landowners. The reaction of the latter, through their political influence, provoked the firm resistance of the so-called league and, after lengthy litigation to prevent their expulsion, the peasants finally took possession of the property by legal expropriation.

That event influenced the growth of other peasant leagues and projected the leadership of Francisco Juliao, who, as a member of the local House of Representatives, voiced his support to the peasants.

Juliao has demonstrated a very definite leftist ideology. He traveled to China and Cuba, he was outspoken in his admiration for Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro, and, in 1961, openly

announced his filiation to communism.[11] He demanded agrarian reforms, yet advocated forcible seizure of land and the institution of a strong national leadership following Castro's model.[12]

Although Juliao became well known through the peasant league movement, he did not represent an overall leadership. Rivalries between Peking-oriented Communists, Castroism, the orthodox Communist Party, and a more independent but still revolutionary group established a permanent dispute for the control of the leagues. As a result, a somewhat confused political pattern was evolved.[13]

Meeting the Crisis. During the Kubitschek Presidency the significance of the political radicalization of the countryside was well understood. Also, the 1958 drought, one of the most severe ever experienced, provoked a record exodus from the rural areas to the coastal cities, and uneasiness reached a peak all over the region.

The establishment of a Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE) was the step taken by the Executive in 1959 as an answer to the crisis. The discussion of the proposal for such agency met considerable opposition in Congress by the conservative groups and the representatives of the landowners. Such opposition was mentioned by Kubitschek when he finally signed the law creating the SUDENE in December 1960:

> I well know the interests that are being antagonized by initiatives such as the Operation Northeast . . . I am obliged to confess with sadness that I encountered obstacles to the new development policy for the Northeast, because the very state of chronic wretchedness of a part of the Brazilian family gave rise to a kind of industry, i.e. to the permanent establishment of avid *clientela* whose interests are frequently in conflict with the real needs of the people.[14]

The SUDENE's program included not only economic development but a change in the social structure of the region. With the enthusiastic support of the local governments and the people, the continuous assistance of the Alliance for Progress, and the adequacy and feasibility of the programs adopted, Brazil has found some effective answers to the Northeast problem.

Results could not be achieved in 2 or 3 years. As a matter of fact, only in 1966 was a sensible modification of the status quo clearly felt. However, the social unrest, largely instigated by the Communist influence, has provoked increased agitation since 1960. Although the Northeast was only a part of the overall problem in Brazil, it contributed to the decision of the Armed Forces to intervene in April 1964 and break down the Jacobin-Communist conspiracy that was overtaking the country.

The demagogic and subversive characteristics of the peasant leagues were eradicated, and the SUDENE received increased support for the attainment of its basic goals, at a quicker pace.

The Influence of the Church. The interest of Brazilian bishops in matters of a socio-political or economic nature dates back to the early 1930's. Only in 1952, however, with the foundation of the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil (CNBB), did that interest take practical form. Through the pastoral letters and organizational activities it became apparent that the Church was trying to be one of the leaders of the social and economic evolution in Brazil. Although the CNBB is a loose association with every bishop autonomous within his own diocese, the influence of the progressive bishops predominated and was greatly reinforced by the Vatican reformist attitude.

Since 1960 the Church has inten-

sively participated in the organization of rural labor unions in some areas of the Northeast. By the end of 1963 the Federation of Unions in Pernambuco claimed to have a membership of some 200,000. Rather than using the violent and demagogic appeals proposed by the peasant leagues' leadership, the Federation "has tended towards a conciliatory policy and has stressed, vis-a-vis the landowners, that respect for the workers' rights leads to social harmony and the avoidance of conflicts." [15]

The Federation was explicitly nonpolitical. Its success provoked reaction from the Communist-inspired government, and, by the end of 1963, through an artifice of a federal unionization of the rural associations, conditions were created for the Communist Party to invade the areas already organized by the Catholic Federation and disrupt the whole effort.[16]

In April 1964, D. Helder Camara, one of the most outspoken prelates in Brazil who has been considered the leader of the progressive bishops, assumed the See of Recife. In the last 3 years the Church has been regrouping the rural labor unions and attracting the members of the former peasant leagues to those unions.

It seems that considerable progress has been made in that direction. At the same time, the continuous struggle between the landowners and the advocates of a radical agrarian reform continues unabated. Rural union leaders in a recent meeting at Pernambuco, with the technical assistance of the Church, protested against the Governments' failure to carry out the pledges of the Brazilian agrarian reform law of 1961 included in the Constitution of 1967. D. Helder Camara supported the leaders in their protest, provided they would not adopt violent measures to achieve the basic reforms.[17]

V — CONCLUSIONS

The Overall Picture. Throughout the foregoing discussion we have tried to cover four basic aspects of the problem concerning the threat of communism in the Western Hemisphere. They are: Latin America's actual environment, the involvement of the United States, the chances for communism, as well as the chances against communism.

The statement that there is a global and permanent threat embodied by communism represents nothing more than a redundancy. The misconception regarding the threat lies primarily in the fact that, since the early days after the Second World War, the strategies conceived by the free world, and more specifically by the United States, did not match adequately the processes put forward to achieve the ultimate goals of communism and the Soviet Union's national interests.

Each particular problem always absorbed the whole attention of the United States and, since the problems were and still are presented by the Soviet Union according to a very carefully planned schedule, it follows that

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Capt. Jose M. Amaral, Brazilian Navy, is a graduate of the Brazilian Naval Academy and the Brazilian Naval War College.

A qualified aviator, Captain Amaral has served as Gunnery Officer on the battleship *Minas Gerais;* Operations Officer on the destroyer *Bawru;* Assistant Air Officer and subsequently Air Officer on the carrier *Minais Gerais.* He has also been assigned to the Aviation Division of the Brazilian Naval Commission in Europe; as Executive Officer, Aviation Training Center; Commanding Officer of Utility Squadron 1, and Chief of Staff of the 4th Naval District of Brazil.

Captain Amaral is a graduate of the Naval Command Course, U.S. Naval War College, Class of 1968.

the positions assumed by the great American nation have a makeshift aspect and a defensive characteristic.

The similarity pointed out by Lerche when he compares the United States attitudes with the ones of a poker player and the Soviet Union with those of the chess player is perhaps self-explanatory; the poker player's game depends upon the random sequence of the cards he gets; in the chess game, however, all the important data is present at the chessboard and the player may plan his future moves.

Unfortunately, one of the moves in the world domination game communism is playing was perceived by the United States only when the card representing Cuba was thrown in its hands.

Latin America's Actual Environment. The urge for development and reforms is the basic characteristic in all the nations of Latin America today. The forces and processes which are engaged in the political struggle, both against the traditionalism and among themselves, have brought to the attention of the peoples new formulas claiming hope for more justice and welfare. Resentment and frustration play a large role in such political process, but the real issue really is — *what* has to be done and *how* to do it.

Traditional concepts, when applied in the turbulent scenario of the present times, normally do not embrace the whole problem. Economic development, for instance, in its traditional definition implies that the only requirement is industry, that industrialization follows automatically from capital formation, and that mobilizing capital is therefore the crucial problem. When applied in countries under a process of modernization, such a concept has to acquire a multidimensional characteristic aimed at the complete transformation of the society.

The complexity of the problem may be exemplified, for instance, in the case of the Brazilian Northeast where the protests of the rural workers against Government slowness in the execution of agrarian reform coincide with the achievement of outstanding results by the same Government in the efforts for the industrialization of the region.

The governments in Latin America understand well the interaction between economic development, in its traditional meaning, and social reforms. All of them are trying, to the best of their ability, to execute adequate and feasible programs to solve the problems of their own countries.

The Chances of Communism. From the analysis of the political systems of Latin America we may come to the conclusion that the ideals and values inherited by the actual societies preclude the advent of a Communist government. However, one Cuba is already in existence in the hemisphere. In the answer to the question of *how* to execute the changes required by Latin Americans lies the key factor regarding communism's possibilities.

It is necessary to consider that the effects of traditionalism also have influenced the prospects of communism in Latin America. A common condition in the underdeveloped countries, the deeply rooted tribal, clan, family, and religious ties have been braking the rise of sharp class barriers and the awakening of revolutionary class consciousness. Both are basic principles within the Marxist doctrine.

The knowledge of its own backwardness and the exortations of Latin Americans for changes may contribute much more to eliminate the effects of traditionalism in Communist strategies than to provide a favorable attitude for the necessary reforms to achieve modernization. The outward flux tends to be stronger than the inward one because

a dual response problem is presented to the Western Hemisphere.

The strategy of the Soviet Union in Latin America is twofold: it includes the spreading of the Communist doctrine in a new area while its final goal is the weakening of its major opponent — the United States. The clear understanding of such conditions may provide a considerable help in the problem-solving process. The changes in Latin America have a sense of urgency and will depend not only upon the inflow of massive foreign investments and national self-discipline but, also, to the extent in which the national economic interests of the United States would be willing to yield for the benefit of the Latin American countries' national interests.

For Latin American governments, the problem posed by the Communist menace connotes urgency in the execution of social reforms and improvements of economic conditions. The alternative is subversion and civil war.

For the United States, it represents a choice between the importance of its present national economic interests and the prevention of future Cubas. Both aspects of the problem are interactive and will decide the future of communism in Latin America.

The Chances Against Communism. The problem proposed for our discussion was: Are the processes in use to meet communism in the Western Hemisphere adequate and feasible?

It seems that an affirmative or a negative answer, as far as the natural processes are considered, would not be accurate. The prevailing conditions in every country determine the validity of the efforts of the components of its political system against the Communist threat.

It may be said, however, that the influence of Catholicism is on the rise in one of the most preferred areas of action for communism — the peasant and worker classes. A struggle for leadership is perhaps a better definition for such a condition. On the other hand, the influence of the military is a very reliable preventive force against communism and is assuming a vital role in the development efforts through the civic action programs.

Nationalism, in its true meaning, represents a barrier against communism. Its immediate goals may be political and economic, but its expectations are human and therein lies its value.

The Alliance for Progress is an adequate process in the struggle against communism. It is possible to assume that the goals proposed in 1961 were out of proportion. During the past 6 years, some 90 billion dollars were invested in Latin America, 80 billion representing national savings. The results, up to now, indicate that the Alliance can be one of the most important weapons to prevent a favonrable environment for the spread of communism.

The political interests involved in foreign aid programs produced, among the Latin Americans, the feeling of relegation to a secondary position. Such feeling did not help in the development of sympathy towards the United States; it weakened as well the mutual understanding that is indispensable in the continuous and total war against Communist influence.

Finally, the Organization of the American States has to be understood as being the result of a continuous and strenuous process to provide the Western Hemisphere with a common basis where the ideals and feelings of each country are to be shared by all the others. The influence of internal factors of a nation determines its foreign policies, and this fact may explain the cautious approach taken by many of the Latin American nations wherever problems of Communist subversion are

considered.

The strength of OAS against communism depends upon the capability of every government to solve the problems of economic development and social reforms within its own country.

The defense of the hemisphere against communism must take on a more dynamic and viable characteristic. It involves not only theoretical values, such as those expressed by the Pan American ideals, but a clear understanding that all the American countries are deeply involved in a permanent struggle, the results of which will have a profound effect on the future generations. It must include the basic knowledge that in a community of nations who pledge for equality and freedom, the concern of one's national interests cannot overcome the interests of the whole community.

FOOTNOTES

I--THE ARENA

1. Milton S. Eisenhower, *The Wine is Bitter* (Garden City: N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. xi.
2. Claudio Veliz, ed., *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 77.
3. Lewis Hanke, *Mexico and the Caribbean* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 157.
4. Karl M. Schmitt and David B. Burks, *Evolution or Chaos* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 44.
5. Some countries like Cuba and Panama achieved politieal independence around the beginning of the 20th century.
6. Alcides Arguedas--Bolivian writer. He explained the situation of the Indians in Raza de Bronze (Raee of Bronze). Also more reeently in Pueblo Enfermo (Siek People).

Euclides da Cunha--Brazilian writer. His book deals with the miserable conditions of the peasants in the Northeast--Os Sertoes (The Backlands), 1902.

Franeisco Encina--Chilean writer. He claimed for basic changes, both social and economic. His book *Our Economic Inferiority: Its Causes and Its Consequences* (1912) went unheeded.

7. Charles W. Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 37.
8. Wolfgang G. Friedmann, *An Introduction to World Politics* (New York: St. Martin's, 1965), p. 307. The author refers to the Calvo Doetrine (1868), a proposition made by the Argentinian jurist Carlos Calvo stating that a government is not bound to indemnify aliens for losses or injuries sustained by them in eonsequenee of domestie disturbances or civil war, and therefore foreign states are not justified in intervening by force or otherwise. Also, the Drago Doetrine (1903) proposed by the Argentinian Minister of Foreign Affairs rejecting the use of military force for the reeovery of public debts.
9. Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin Americe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 108.
10. Friedmann, p. 307.
11. Hanke, p. 101.
12. Gerhard Masur, *Nationalism in Latin America* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 70.
13. Benjamin Akzin, *State and Nation* (London: Hutchinson, 1964), p. 46.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
15. Veliz, *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, p. 1.
16. Masur, p. 72.
17. Arthur P. Whitaker, "Varieties of Nationalism in Latin Americe," *Orbis*, Winter 1967, p. 1186.
18. Robert N. Burr, *Our Troubled Hemisphere* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 77.
19. John W. Spanier, *World Politics in an Age of Revolution* (New York, Praeger, 1967), p. 3.
20. Whitaker, p. 1187.

II--THE THREAT

1. Robert J. Alexander, *Today's Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), p. 160.
2. William Petersen, ed., *The Realities of World Communism* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 190.
3. Joseph W. Reidy, *Strategy for the Americas* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 101.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Spanier, p. 73.
7. Friedmann, p. 91.
8. Richard H. Sanger, *The Insurgent Era* (Washington: Potomac Books, 1967), p. 105.
9. Amitai Etzioni, *Winning without War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 80.
10. Spanier, p. 192.
11. Hanke, p. 169.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
13. Economists call the "demonstration effect" the realization by the low income groups that there are others who live better than they do and their desire also to achieve this improved standard.
14. Stanislav Andreski, *Parasitism and Subversion* (London: Trinity Press, 1966), p. 213.
15. Eisenhower, p. 329.
16. William A. Williams, *The Shaping of American Diplomacy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1956), v. II, p. 503-511.
17. Burr, p. 10.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
19. Williams, p. 766.
20. The principle of nonintervention insisted by the Latin Americans and twice stated in the Charter of OAS (articles 15 and 17) was perhaps the sole reminiscent effect of the U.S. imperialistic period.
21. Burr, p. 22.
22. J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 95.
23. Andreski, p. 209.
24. Burr, p. 107.
25. Alexander, p. 157.
26. Regis Debray, "Marxist Strategy in Latin America," *New Left*, September-October 1967, p. 23.
27. APRA (Alianza Popular Revolutionaria Americana), Peruvian Party, at first extremist and Marxist, has modified its philosophical base to anticommunism and extreme nationalism. (See Schmitt and Burks, p. 204.)
28. Debray, p. 24.
29. Herbert S. Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," *The American Political Science Review*, March 1967, p. 90.
30. Semion Rostovsky, *The New York Times*, 14 January 1968.
31. *Soviet Foreign Policy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), p. 38.
32. Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 123.

III--MEETING THE THREAT

1. Samuel H. Beer, et al., *Patterns of Government* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 21.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
4. The specific case of Cuba does not invalidate such generalization. It is rather a sorry exception.
5. John D. Martz, ed., *The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 30.
6. Martz, p. 41.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 42. Quoting Edmund Burke, English statesman (1729-1797).
8. Beer, p. 46.
9. Burr, p. 90.
10. Martz, p. 12.

11. Dexter Perkins, *The Diplomacy of a New Age* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 147.
12. Donald W. Bray, "Latin American Political Parties: an Overview," *The Review of Politics,* January 1967, p. 76.
13. Burr, p. 100.
14. Alexander, p. 154.
15. Veliz, *Obstacles to Change in Latin America,* p. 1.
16. Perkins, p. 147.
17. Alexander, p. 224.
18. Pope John XXIII was papal ambassador in France between 1944 and 1953 and Venice's archbishop between 1953 and 1958. Pope Paul VI was Milan's archbishop between 1948 and 1953. Both were directly involved in the struggle between the Church and communism for the control of labor and youth movements in France and Italy, the result of which was clearly favourable to the Catholics.
19. Alexander, p. 235.
20. William Manger, *Pan America in Crisis* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961), p. 52.
21. Burr, p. 12.
22. Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter are a result of Latin American insistence.
23. Jerome Slater, *The OAS and United States Foreign Policy* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1967), p. 22.
24. Hanke, p. 10.
25. Roberto O. Campos, *Reflections on Latin American Development* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), p. 151.
26. Herbert L. Matthews, ed., *The United States and Latin America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 148.
27. Simon G. Hanson, *Five Years of the Alliance for Progress: an Appraisal* (Washington: Inter-American Affairs Press, 1967), p. 67.
28. Campos, p. 158.
29. *Ibid.,* p. 153.
30. Sol M. Linowitz, "Hemisphere Cooperation through the Alliance for Progress" *The Department of State Bulletin,* 6 November 1967, p. 617.
31. Herbert Feis, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* (New York: Dell, 1966), p. VII.
32. Manger, p. 88.
33. Jules Davids, *America and the World of Our Time* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 540.

IV--THE BRAZILIAN NORTHEAST: A CASE STUDY

1. A comparison of size and population with other Latin American countries will show that the Brazilian Northeast has less area than only Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela. Its population is the largest except for Argentina and Mexico. It represents 11.2 percent of the total area of Brazil and it contains 24 percent of the Brazilian population.
2. Charles Wagley, *An Introduction to Brazil* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 30.
3. Gilberto Freyre, *The Masters and the Slaves* (New York: Knopf, 1966), p. 30.
4. Wagley, p. 36.
5. *Ibid.,* p. 35.
6. Sertanejo--Inhabitant of the sertao (backlands). Freyre, p. 428.
7. cf., p. 6, Euclides da Cunha.
8. Joao Cafe Filho, *Do Sindicato as Catete* (Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olimpio, 1966), p. 80.
9. *Ibid.,* p. 88.
10. Schmitt and Burks, p. 77.
11. Wagley, p. 50.
12. Schmitt and Burks, p. 172.
13. Veliz, *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America.* p. 213.
14. Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys towards Progress,* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1965), p. 118.
15. Veliz, *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America,* p. 214.
16. *Ibid.,* p. 215.
17. "Prelates in Brazil Support Reforms," *The New York Times,* 6 February 1968, p. 7:1.

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One should know one's enemies, their alliances, their resources and nature of their country, in order to plan a campaign. One should know what to expect of one's friends, what resources one has, and foresee the future effects to determine what one has to fear or hope from political maneuvers.

Frederick The Great: Instructions for His Generals, iv, 1747